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In September 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court 
reached a decision that could profoundly impact accountability for transnational 
human rights violations. In its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that it has 
jurisdiction over the crime against humanity of deportation as it relates to the 
government of Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya ethnic group. This decision is 
remarkable for the fact that Myanmar is not a state party to the Rome Statute and 
therefore not directly subject to the International Criminal Court’s Statute. The Court 
circumvented this problem by ruling that a portion of the crime was committed in 
Bangladesh permitting the exercise jurisdiction in this matter. This article endeavours 
to accomplish two goals. First, it analyses the Pre-Trial Chamber’s ruling to 
determine whether it complies with the Rome Statute and international law. Second, it 
will discuss the ramifications of the decision and consider whether it can act as a 
partial solution for addressing transnational human rights violations being committed 
in the territory of non-states parties. The article concludes that the decision itself is 
open to question, creating a danger that it will be susceptible to challenge. The 
International Criminal Court needs to ensure that these sorts of controversial decisions 
have a firm legal foundation to better deliver justice to the victims of atrocity crimes 
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In September 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court 
reached a decision that could profoundly impact accountability for transnational 
human rights violations. In its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that it has 
jurisdiction over the crime against humanity of deportation as it relates to the 
government of Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya ethnic group. The decision is 
remarkable for the fact that it permits the Court to exercise jurisdiction over members 
of the Burmese government for actions they performed entirely within the territory of 
Myanmar. Myanmar is not a state party to the Rome Statute and therefore not directly 
subject to the Court’s Statute. The Pre-Trial Chamber circumvented this problem by 
ruling that deportation is a crime that necessarily involves the displacement of people 
across national borders, meaning that some element of the crime takes place in more 
than one country. In this case, the Rohingya were displaced to Bangladesh, which is a 
state party to the Rome Statute. By virtue of that fact, the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled 
that a portion of the crime was committed in Bangladesh permitting the International 
Criminal Court to exercise jurisdiction in this matter. On the surface, this appears to 
be a positive development. It signifies the existence of a new approach for ending 
impunity for human rights violations by introducing the possibility of holding 
individuals liable that would otherwise have escaped accountability for their actions. 
Unfortunately, concerns about some of the legal underpinnings of the decision 
suggest that the decision may have been incorrectly decided. This raises the danger 
that the decision will be subject to challenge leading to the Rohingya once again 
being deprived of an opportunity for justice.1   
2. Background 
 The Rohingya living in Myanmar’s Rakhine state have been the target of 
widespread state-sponsored violence since at least 1978.2 This campaign of violence 
                                                        
1 For more on this decision and other issues surrounding the Rohingya crisis see P. 
Akhavan, ‘The Radically Routine Rohingya Case: Territorial Jurisdiction and the 
Crime of Deportation under the ICC Statute’, 17(2) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2019); B. Van Schaack, ‘Determining the Commission of Genocide in 
Myanmar’, 17(2) JICJ (2019). 
2 Public Interest Law and Policy Group, Documenting Atrocity Crimes Committed 
Against the Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine State: Factual Findings & Legal 
Analysis (Public Interest Law & Policy Group, 2018), at 5. 
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is the result of a pervasive belief amongst the government, state-controlled media and 
much of the population of Myanmar that the Rohingya are illegal ‘Bengali’ 
immigrants who threaten national security.3 The Burma Citizenship Law of 1982 
exacerbates this idea by effectively excluding the Rohingya from recognition as 
citizens of Myanmar. The law specifically identifies eight ethnic groups whose 
members are eligible for citizenship.4 Those ethnic groups can be further divided into 
135 national races, the members of which can be considered citizens of Myanmar.5 
The Rohingya are not one of these 135 groups, meaning that they are largely barred 
from citizenship and the rights associated with that status.6 
 In 2012, there was an uptick in military-perpetrated violence against the 
Rohingya.7 This renewed period of unrest started as reprisal attacks following the 
gang rape and murder of a Rakhine woman by a group of three Rohingya men.8 These 
reprisal attacks incited the Rohingya residents of Maungdaw town to riot and mob 
violence by both Rohingyas and Rakhines in Sittwe.9 The government responded by 
declaring a state of emergency in Rakhine state, which granted authority to the 
military to intervene in the situation.10 This resulted in human rights abuses being 
committed against the Rohingya, including the unlawful use of force, torture, the 
destruction of property, arbitrary detention and internal displacement.11  
 The human rights abuses committed in 2012 represented a turning point for 
the Rohingya in Rakhine state.12 They ushered in a period of growing distrust and 
deteriorating relations between the Rohingya and other ethnic groups. Violence 
between the Rohingya and the government escalated again in 2016 in response to 
                                                        
3 Ibid. 
4 Burmese Citizenship Law of 1982 (16 October 1982) Ch. II(3). 
5 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on Myanmar, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64 (12 September 2018), at ¶ 12. 
6 PILPG supra note 2, at 5. 
7 Ibid at 5-6. 
8 Human Rights Watch, ‘“The Government Could Have Stopped This”: Sectarian 
Violence and Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State’ (31 July 2012) 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/31/government-could-have-stopped/sectarian-
violence-and-ensuing-abuses-burmas-arakan#> accessed 12 March 2019. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, Doc. No. GE.18-15350(E) (18 
September 2018), at ¶ 26. 
12 Ibid at ¶ 27. 
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attacks carried out by Rohingya militant groups and resulted in the widespread 
internal displacement of the Rohingya. 13  Then, on 25 August 2017, the Arakan 
Rohingya Salvation Army (‘ARSA’), a Rohingya militant group, launched a series of 
attacks against government forces. 14  In response, the government of Myanmar 
launched a large-scale military assault against the Rohingya that caused the 
displacement of more than 700,000 Rohingyas across the border into Bangladesh.15  
 Following the forced migration, Rohingyas interviewed in Bangladesh 
reported that the Myanmar military committed excessive acts of violence against the 
Rohingya during this period, including indiscriminate killings, sexual violence, 
torture, the mutilation of corpses and extrajudicial executions.16 The military also 
destroyed a substantial amount of real property. Acts of arson were common, and 
satellite imagery apparently demonstrates that more than 360 villages that had been 
primarily inhabited by the Rohingyas were completely or substantially destroyed.17 
These acts of violence did not end with the displacement of the Rohingyas from their 
places of residence. During their flight to Bangladesh, some Rohingyas were maimed 
or killed by landmines placed along paths near the border of Myanmar and 
Bangladesh.18 The military continued to murder people at border crossings to ensure 
they would not remain in Myanmar.19 
 The ostensible purpose of the military campaign was to eliminate the threat of 
violence posed by the ARSA.20 However, this justification appears largely to be a pre-
text for a broader operation. Members of the government made several statements 
suggesting the operations had a purpose that extended beyond just purging the 
Rohingya community of militants. Government officials referred to the military’s 
actions as ‘clearance operations’ and the military Commander-In-Chief, Senior 
General Min Aung Hlaing stated that the ‘problem’ of the Rohingya ‘was a long-
                                                        
13 Medecins Sans Frontieres, ‘“No One Was Left”: Death and Violence Against the 
Rohingya in Rakhine State, Myanmar (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2018), at 11. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings, supra note 11, at ¶ 27. 
16 Medecins Sans Frontieres, supra note 13, at 8, 10. 
17 Human Rights Watch, Bangladesh Is Not My Country: The Plight of Rohingya 
Refugees From Myanmar (Human Rights Watch, 2018), at 24. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission’, supra note 5, at ¶ 41. 
20 Ibid at ¶ 33. 
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standing one’ which the government was ‘taking great care’ to solve.21 The soldiers 
directly involved in carrying out the operations also made comments suggesting that 
the operation was directed against the entire Rohingya population. Some Rohingya 
reported being ordered to ‘leave the country; this is not your country’ and ‘you can’t 
live in my country, go away from my country.’22 Others recounted being told ‘[y]ou 
do not belong here – go to Bangladesh.’ 23  Still others indicated that they were 
encouraged not to return to Myanmar or they would be killed.24 While the comments 
of individual soldiers cannot be understood to represent the overall purpose of the 
government, they are certainly indicative of the general attitude with which the 
military operation was being carried out. 
  The evidence suggests that the acts of violence carried out by the military 
were directed at the entire Rohingya community and not just militants within that 
community.25 This conclusion is based on the huge impact the operations had on the 
entire Rohingya community as compared to the relatively small number of Rohingya 
militants thought to exist at the time. The Myanmar government estimated that only 
1,000 Rohingya militants took part in the 25 August 2017 attacks that lead to the 
commencement of the military operations.26 By comparison, a conservative estimate 
indicates that more than 9,400 people were killed during the month following the 
beginning of the military operation.27 700,000 people fled to Bangladesh.28 Hundreds 
of villages were attacked by the military, many of which were entirely obliterated 
either through arson or by being bulldozed. 29  The destruction of crops and 
infrastructure, the poisoning of sources of drinking water and the theft of livestock all 
suggest that measures were being taken against the entire community and were aimed 
                                                        
21 Ibid at ¶ 35. 
22 PILPG, supra note 2, at 64. 
23 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Mission Report of the 
OHCHR Rapid Response Mission to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh’ (13-27 September 
2017) 5. 
24 PILPG, supra note 2, at 85. 
25 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission’, supra note 5, at ¶ 33. 
26 Fortify Rights, ‘“They Gave Them Long Swords”: Preparations for Genocide and 
Crimes Against Humanity Against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, Myanmar’ 
(Fortify Rights, 2018) 112. 
27 Medecins Sans Frontieres, supra note 13, at 23. 
28 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Detailed Findings’, supra note 11, at ¶ 27. 
29 Human Rights Watch, Bangladesh Is Not My Country, supra note 17, at 24. 
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at ‘ensuring the Rohingyas’ permanent removal’ from Myanmar.30 This signifies that 
the extent of the operations far exceeded the purported goal of eradicating the terrorist 
threat posed by Rohingya militants. 
 There is also reason to believe that the Burmese government did not just 
intend to displace the Rohingya from Myanmar. The incredible brutality of the 
violence directed at the Rohingya has lead some observers to conclude that at least 
some of the perpetrators were acting with the goal of exterminating the Rohingya.31 
One investigator concluded, ‘the Burmese had basically achieved their desire to force 
the Rohingya into Bangladesh, yet that wasn’t sufficient – instead they preferred the 
Rohingya dead.’32 This raises the prospect that the outcome sought by some of the 
perpetrators went beyond deportation and may have more closely resembled 
genocide.  
3. The Issues Before the Court 
 This is the backdrop against which the Prosecutor’s Office submitted its 
Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute in April 2018.33 
The Request addressed two issues, one procedural and one substantive. The 
procedural matter relates to whether Article 19(3) permits the prosecutor to request a 
jurisdictional ruling during this stage of proceedings while the substantive question is 
directed towards whether the International Criminal Court could exercise jurisdiction 
over the forcible deportation of the Rohingya across the border separating Myanmar 
and Bangladesh. The Prosecutor sought an affirmative answer to both questions.  
A. The Procedural Issue 
 The Office of the Prosecutor based its argument about the procedural question 
on three separate grounds.34 First, it suggests that a plain reading of Article 19(3) 
supports the idea that the article is broad in scope and permits the Prosecutor’s Office 
to request a ruling on ‘the full range of jurisdictional issues arising under the 
Statute’.35 It is also submitted that the article itself contains no language limiting its 
                                                        
30 PILPG, supra note 2, at 51, 64. 
31 Ibid at 51. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Application Under Regulation 46(3) (Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on 
Jurisdiction Under Article 19(3) of the Statute) No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, Pres PT 
Ch (9 April 2018). 
34 Ibid at ¶ 26. 
35 Ibid at ¶ 52. 
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application to any particular phase of proceedings.36 Next, the Prosecutor’s Office 
argues that when Article 19(3) is placed in the appropriate context its application 
should not be confined only to the case stage of proceedings. This argument is 
supported by a the claims that judicial practice, legal commentators and the general 
principle of law, compétence de la compétence support the proposition that a 
determination about the Court’s jurisdiction may be reached at any point in 
proceedings.37 Finally, the Prosecutor’s Office found support for its position in the 
object and purpose of Article 19(3). It submits that Article 19(3), when used properly, 
can promote judicial economy and the appropriate use of prosecutorial resources, by 
‘allowing judicial consideration of certain fundamental questions’ before the 
Prosecutor pursues potentially contentious actions.38 
Pre-Trial Chamber I issued its opinion on the Prosecutor’s Request on 6 
September 2018. Before fully addressing the Prosecutor’s arguments, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber remarked on the controversial nature of the Prosecutor’s submissions 
regarding Article 19(3). Rather than try to resolve that controversy, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber chose to avoid it. Instead of considering whether Article 19(3) is applicable 
under these circumstances, the Pre-Trial Chamber applied Articles 119(1) and 
21(1)(b) when reaching its decision.  
It is probable that Pre-Trial Chamber I chose the alternative avenues of Article 
119(1) and Article 21(1)(b) as the statutory bases for its decision as it knew that 
Article 19(3) could not be applied at this stage of the proceedings. When read on its 
own, it is reasonable to understand Article 19(3) to mean that the Office of the 
Prosecutor may seek a ruling about jurisdiction and admissibility at any time. That is 
because subparagraph (3) does not contain an explicit qualifier limiting its application 
to a particular stage of proceedings.39 However, when subparagraph (3) is placed in 
context with the rest of Article 19 it becomes clear that determinations about 
jurisdiction or admissibility can only be made once a matter has become a case.  
Subparagraph (1) of Article 19 permits the Court to ‘satisfy itself that is has 
jurisdiction in any case brought before it.’ 40  A similar limitation is found in 
                                                        
36 Ibid at ¶ 53. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid at ¶ 54. 
39 Art. 19(3) ICCSt. 
40 Art. 19(1) ICCSt. 
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subparagraph (2) in relation to challenges to admissibility. Subparagraph (2) grants 
the ability to challenge ‘the admissibility of a case’ to three different interested 
groups. 41  Both of these sections explicitly limit inquiries into jurisdiction and 
admissibility to matters that have become cases. This is significant because a case 
does not exist at the International Criminal Court until a warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear is issued, i.e. until the accused is formally identified. 42  This 
definition comports with the findings of Pre-Trial Chamber I in a decision relating to 
victim participation in the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. There, Pre-
Trial Chamber I found that a case involves ‘specific incidents during which one or 
more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court seem to have been committed by one 
or more identified suspects’.43 Based on this definition, the Court, interested states 
including those with jurisdiction over the matter and the accused are only permitted to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court or the admissibility of a 
case after an accused is formally identified. 
  In contrast, if Article 19(3) is read in the manner suggested, then the Office 
of the Prosecutor is not subject to a similar limitation. This would mean that the 
Office of the Prosecutor has a right to question the Court’s jurisdiction that is even 
more expansive than that which is possessed by the Court itself. It is an unsupportable 
conclusion that the drafters of the Statute intended to give the Office of the Prosecutor 
more power in this regard than the Court or any other interested parties. Judge Marc 
Perrin de Brichambaut concurred with this conclusion in his partially dissenting 
opinion from the Decision of the Court with respect to the Prosecutor’s Request in 
this matter. He found that Article 19(3), when placed in its proper context, is not 
applicable until a matter has reached the case stage of proceedings.44  
This reading of Article 19(3) has its detractors. In their jointly written chapter 
in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos’ commentary on the Rome Statute, Christopher 
Hall, Daniel Nsereko and Manuel Ventura reach the opposite conclusion. In their 
                                                        
41 Art. 19(2) ICCSt. 
42 W.A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (5th ed, 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), at 277. 
43 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Decision on the Applications for 
Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and 
VPRS 6) No. ICC-01/04, PT Ch I (17 January 2006) ¶ 65. 
44 Request Under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court (Partially 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut) No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, 
PT Ch (6 September 2018) ¶ 12. 
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view, the fact that Article 19(3), unlike Article 19(1) and 19(2), does not contain an 
explicit restriction limiting its application to the case phase of proceedings is 
significant.45 They do not elaborate on this point and focus entirely on the plain 
language of the Statute without making any attempt to understand the article in 
context. The Prosecutor’s Office relied on this interpretation in its Request without 
mentioning any of the opposing commentary. 
 Instead of attempting to unpick this thorny issue, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
ignored it and relied on Article 119(1) as a partial basis for its decision. Article 119(1) 
states that ‘[a]ny dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled 
by the decision of the Court.’46 Although the phrase ‘judicial functions’ is rather 
vague, it has been defined broadly to include questions of jurisdiction.47 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber interpreted this to mean that it is ‘empowered to rule on the question of 
jurisdiction set out in the Request.’48 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s approach to Article 
119(1) is not universally accepted. William Schabas points out that neither the Rome 
Statute or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence contain a mechanism for the 
International Criminal Court to adjudicate disputes about its judicial functions.49 He 
posits that the purpose of the article is not to authorise the Court to make decisions 
about its own judicial functions, but instead is meant to bar other bodies from 
questioning the decisions of the Court.50  
 It is important to point out that Article 19(1) sets out a practice whereby the 
Court can reach a determination about its jurisdiction. Article 19(1) explicitly states 
that ‘The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before 
it.’51  This provision clearly gives the Court the authority to rule on questions of 
                                                        
45 C.K. Hall, D.D. Ntanda Nsereko and M.J. Ventura, ‘Article 19: Challenges to the 
Jurisdiction of the Court or the Admissibility of a Case, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos 
(eds.), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn., 
Hart, 2016), at 875. 
46 Art. 119(1) ICCSt. 
47 R.S. Clark, ‘Article 119’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds.), The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn., Hart, 2016), at 1729. 
48 Request Under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court (Decision on the 
“Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction Under Article 19(3) of the 
Statute) No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, PT Ch (6 September 2018) ¶ 28. 
49 W.A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 2016), at 1485. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Art. 19(1) ICCSt. 
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jurisdiction but limits the exercise of that authority to the case stage of proceedings. 
This demonstrates that while the Court does have the authority to rule on questions of 
jurisdiction like the one raised by the Prosecutor’s Office, it cannot exercise that 
authority at this stage of proceedings. To read Article 119(1) in such a way as to 
permit the Court to enter a decision about jurisdiction at anytime would effectively 
render Article 19(1) meaningless. It is a well-established legal principle that all of the 
words used by the drafters when writing a Treaty or Statute should be given effect.52 
Trial Chamber V(A) of the International Criminal Court recognised this principle in a 
decision in the Prosecutor v Ruto et al. The Trial Chamber found that the Statute 
should not be read in a manner that results in another part of the Statute being made 
redundant. 53  Instead, the Statute must be read as a whole because there may be 
provisions in the Statute that impose limitations on the provision under consideration 
that are not apparent when viewing the relevant part in isolation.54 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Trial Chamber relied heavily on the jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice.55 
The Pre-Trial Chamber ignored this earlier jurisprudence by reading Article 119(1) in 
such a way as to render Article 19(1) meaningless. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision 
makes no reference to the limitation on making determinations about jurisdiction 
found in Article 19(1). This omission casts serious doubt on the applicability of 
Article 119(1) when deciding on the request made by the Prosecutor’s Office.  
Pre-Trial Chamber I also found that Article 21(1)(b) of the Statute gave it the 
authority to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction over the deportation of the 
Rohingya. Article 21(1) establishes the various sources of law the Court may rely on 
when reaching a decision. The sources contained in subparagraph (a) are the Statute, 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes; subparagraph (b) includes 
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law; and subparagraph 
                                                        
52 Prosecutor v Ruto et al. (Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal From 
Continuous Presence During Trial) No. ICC-01/09-01/11, TC V(5) (22 June 2013) ¶ 
39. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid at ¶ 31. 
55 Ibid at ¶¶ 31, 39; citing Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural Labour, 
PCIJ Series B, Nos 2 and 3 (1922) 23; Corfu Channel case (Judgment of 9 April 
1949) (1949) ICJ Reports 4, 24; Interpretation of Peace Treaties (Second Phase) 
Advisory Opinion (1950) ICJ Reports 221, 229. 
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(c) encompasses general principles of law.56 These sources are placed in a three-tiered 
hierarchy, with the Article 21(1)(a) sources at the top and the Article 21(1)(c) sources 
at the bottom.57 In Prosecutor v Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed the place of 
the Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes at the apex of 
the hierarchy and went on to find that the sources described in Articles 21(1)(b) and 
(c) should only be applied when: 1) there is a lacuna in the Article 21(1)(a) sources; 
and 2) that lacuna cannot be filled by the application of the criteria found in Articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Article 21(3) of the 
Rome Statute.58  
The first criterion established in the Bashir case, that there must be a lacuna in 
the Statute before recourse can be made to the Article 21(1)(b) and (c) sources, would 
seem to preclude the Pre-Trial Chamber from basing its decision on one of those 
sources. Clearly, if the Pre-Trial Chamber believes that Article 119(1) applies to this 
matter it cannot also think that there is a gap in the Statute permitting recourse to 
Article 21(1)(b). Additionally, Article 19(1) explicitly identifies the stage of 
proceedings at which the International Criminal Court may make a determination 
about jurisdiction. However, despite the absence of a lacuna in the Statute, the Pre-
Trial Chamber saw fit to demonstrate that it possessed the necessary competence to 
decide the jurisdictional issue pursuant to an Article 21(1)(b) source. In this case it 
relied on the established principle of law of la compétence de la competence, which is 
the long-established idea that a body possessing jurisdictional authority has the ability 
to delineate the extent of its own authority. 59  The International Court of Justice 
defined the principle when ruling on the preliminary objections in the Nottebahm 
Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), as standing for the proposition that ‘in the absence 
of any agreement to the contrary, an international tribunal has the right to decide as to 
its own jurisdiction and has the power to interpret for this purpose the instruments 
                                                        
56 Art. 21 ICCSt.  
57  Schabas, Commentary, supra note 49, at 515. 
58 Prosecutor v Bashir (Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) No. ICC-02/05-01/09, PT Ch I (4 
March 2009) ¶ 126. 
59 Permanent Court of International Justice, Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish 
Agreement on December 1st, 1926 (Final Protocol, Article IV), Advisory Opinion of 
28 August 1928, Series B, No. 16, p. 20; see also The Walfish Bay Boundary Case 
(Germany, Great Britain), Award of 23 May 1911, Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, vol. XI, p. 263, ¶ LXVII. 
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which govern that jurisdiction’.60 Pre-Trial Chamber I then explained that this concept 
had been extended to international and regional criminal law and human rights courts 
and tribunals, and specifically to the International Criminal Court.61 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber concluded that the principle of la compétence de la competence endows it 
with the ability to Rule on the Prosecutor’s Request.62 
An analysis of the relevant sections of the Statute tends to indicate that, 
contrary to its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not have the competence to decide 
the issue of jurisdiction before it. Three different possible bases are suggested under 
which the Court may be able to exercise its authority in this matter. A close 
examination of all three indicates that none of them authorise the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to make a decision in this area. Article 19(3) is only applicable during the case stage 
of proceedings, a stage that this matter has not yet reached. Additionally, reading 
Article 19(3) in the manner proposed by the Prosecutor would mean that the 
Prosecutor has more power than the Court itself to raise inquiries regarding 
jurisdiction. Article 119(1) also cannot be relied upon. If it is read in such a way to 
permit the Court to reach a decision about jurisdiction at any time, as suggested by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, it would render Article 19(1) meaningless. Such an interpretation 
does not comport with international law, which mandates that effect needs to be given 
to all aspects of the treaty or statute under consideration. Resort can also not be made 
to Article 21(1)(b). This article is only operative if there is a lacuna in the Statute, 
which there clearly is not in this situation.  As a result, there is no statutory basis upon 
which the Pre-Trial Chamber can justify making a decision about whether the Court 
has jurisdiction over the crime against humanity of deportation as it relates to the 
forcible transfer of the Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh.   
 B. The Substantive Issue 
The Prosecutor’s substantive request is framed as a question about whether the 
International Criminal Court could exercise jurisdiction over the alleged forcible 
deportation of the Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh.63 Deportation is a crime 
against humanity pursuant to Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute that outlaws the 
                                                        
60 Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Preliminary Objections), Judgment 
of 18 November 1953, [1953] ICJ Rep. 111, p. 119.  
61 Decision on Prosecution’s Request, supra note 48, at ¶¶ 31-3. 
62 Ibid at ¶ 33. 
63 Prosecution’s Request, supra note 33, at ¶ 1.   
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‘[d]eportation or forcible transfer of population’ ‘when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack’.64 The Statute goes on to define deportation and forcible 
transfer more specifically as the ‘forced displacement of the persons concerned by 
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, 
without grounds permitted under international law’. 65  The Prosecutor’s Office 
suggests in its request that although ‘the coercive acts relevant to the deportation’ 
occurred in the territory of Myanmar, a non-state party, an essential legal element of 
the crime, crossing an international border, happened in Bangladesh, which is a state 
party.66 The purpose of the request was to clarify whether the Court would have 
jurisdiction over these crimes before the Office of the Prosecutor embarked on a 
preliminary examination of the situation.67  
As a preliminary point, it is generally agreed that Article 7(1)(d) describes two 
separate but related crimes: deportation and forcible transfer.68 Both crimes involve 
similar conduct; what distinguishes the two is the final destination of the victims of 
the crime. Deportation occurs when people are displaced across an international 
border while forcible transfer results when they are displaced but remain in the 
territory of one state.69 Therefore, an implicit element of the crime of deportation is 
that the people involved are displaced across an international border. This is 
consistent with the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes, which 
indicates that deportation occurs when ‘one or more persons’ is displaced into 
‘another State…by expulsion or other coercive acts.’70 While the Pre-Trial Chamber 
went to great lengths to demonstrate its conclusion on this point, there is nothing 
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particularly controversial about it. 
 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s approach to Article 12(2) proved to be more 
provocative. Article 12(2) delineates the preconditions that must exist before the 
Court can exercise its jurisdiction following the referral of a situation to the Court by 
a state party or where the prosecutor has initiated an investigation propio motu.71 
Jurisdiction can be exercised in these situations when either: the place in which the 
alleged conduct in question occurred is located in a state that is a party to the Rome 
Statute; or a person accused of a crime is a national of a state party.72 The Office of 
the Prosecutor’s Request to the Pre-Trial Chamber is concerned with the first of these 
two situations. The Pre-Trial Chamber found that for jurisdiction to exist under 
Article 12(2)(a) at least one legal element of the crime alleged must take place within 
the territory of a state that is a party to the Rome Statute.73 The Pre-Trial Chamber 
further reasons that because the crime of deportation involves the affected people 
crossing an international border, the conduct involved must necessarily take place in 
two different states.74 In the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view that means that because the 
Rohingya were forced into Bangladesh some of the conduct making up the crime 
against humanity of deportation took place in the territory of a state party providing 
the Court with jurisdiction over the crime.75 
 The trouble the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision is that it may not properly 
interpret Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute. The Pre-Trial Chamber understood the 
term ‘conduct’ expansively so as to mean that any element of an alleged crime is 
conduct within the meaning of the article. This led it to the conclusion that the 
International Criminal Court has jurisdiction in this matter. However, the Statute does 
not say that jurisdiction exists so long as some element of the crime takes place in the 
territory of a state party. Instead, it requires that ‘the conduct in question’ must occur 
in the territory of a state party.76 The confusion surrounding this issue is a product of 
the fact that the Court has not previously defined the term ‘conduct’, either generally 
or in terms of Article 12(2)(a). This raises the following questions: Does ‘conduct’ 
refer to the criminal conduct of the accused? Or can any action taken by anyone that 
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makes up some element of the crime be considered ‘conduct’ under this section of the 
Statute?  
 The Office of the Prosecutor foresaw this problem in its request and advocated 
in favour of understanding conduct broadly so that its meaning is not limited only to 
the criminal acts committed by the alleged perpetrator.77 The Office of the Prosecutor 
argument rests on its application of the rules of interpretation set out in Article 31(1) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.78 First, it claimed that the plain-
meaning of the term ‘conduct’ is not instructive because it fails to establish “how 
much conduct is required or what constitutes conduct.’ 79  This is an interesting 
supposition by virtue of the fact that the Office of the Prosecutor’s request does not 
actually provide a definition of ‘conduct’. In the end, this may be of relatively little 
import. When used as a noun, ‘conduct’ can be defined generally as ‘the manner in 
which a person behaves’, ‘personal behavior’ or ‘a person’s deeds.’ 80  These 
definitions are quite broad and not particularly responsive to the questions posed by 
the Prosecutor’s Office’s request. They do suggest that conduct can be understood 
broadly to refer to the acts or omissions of any person but do not address how 
extensive activities must be to be considered conduct. 
 However, an inquiry into understanding the plain meaning of a term should 
not stop with dictionary definitions. The test for determining the plain meaning of a 
term is not necessarily ‘what the ordinary person would understand it to mean’, but 
should also take account of how ‘a person reasonably informed in that subject’ might 
understand the term.81 A variety of scholars have attempted to explain ‘conduct’ in 
the context of the Rome Statute. Antonio Cassese defined ‘conduct’ as ‘certain 
behaviour’ that is criminalized under international rules.82 Gerhard Werle indicates 
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that conduct is ‘an act or omission’ set out in the definition of the crime.83 Douglas 
Guilfoyle describes conduct as an act or omission ‘prohibited by a rule of 
international law.’84 These definitions are responsive to both of the questions the 
Office of the Prosecutor suggested were not adequately answered when considering 
the plain meaning of the term ‘conduct’. They demonstrate that conduct consists of 
those activities that are described as criminal under international law. Further, the 
amount of conduct required is that which is enough to constitute criminal acts. 
Therefore, the Office of the Prosecutor may have been incorrect when it asserted that 
the meaning of conduct could not be understood by its plain meaning.  
 Additionally, the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes can reasonably be 
read to mean that it is the acts attributable to the alleged perpetrator that constitute 
conduct within the meaning of the Statute. Article 7 of the Statute states ‘[f]or the 
purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:…(d) deportation or forcible 
transfer of population.’ 85  This formulation specifically defines crimes against 
humanity as acts being directed against civilians, that is to say, which by their very 
nature must be committed by the alleged criminal perpetrators. The victims are only 
involved to the extent that they are the objects of those acts. No requirement exists 
mandating that victims behave in any particular way for the crime to be completed. 
This suggests that the actions about which the Statute is concerned are the acts of the 
alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The text of the Elements of Crimes 
also supports this conclusion. The introduction to the section on crimes against 
humanity states that the conduct involved is that which ‘is impermissible under 
generally applicable international law’, i.e. illegal acts performed by the people 
perpetrating crimes. 86 There is no reference to how victims must behave for a crime 
against humanity to exist. The statement, ‘[a] particular conduct may constitute one or 
more crimes’ further reinforces this point.87 This implies that the conduct about which 
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the Elements of Crimes are concerned is criminal conduct committed by the alleged 
perpetrator, not how people act after a crime has been committed against them.  
  The Office of the Prosecutor next argued that ‘conduct’ should be understood 
more broadly when placed in the context of the Rome Statute.88 It supports its opinion 
on two bases. The first suggests that ‘conduct’ is synonymous with ‘crime’, and that 
because a crime necessarily includes each individual element so to does conduct.89 
The second ground alleges that there is no clear distinction between conduct and 
consequence and that they should be considered one and the same. The Office of the 
Prosecutor supports its first argument by advocating that the term ‘conduct’ is used in 
the first clause of Article 12(2)(a), while ‘crime’ is used in the second clause, 
although both words appear to be describing the same thing. On that basis it is argued 
that it would be illogical for ‘conduct’ and ‘crime’ to not be synonymous as that 
would mean that the jurisdictional test would change depending on where the crime 
occurred.90  
 While there is some foundation for the Office of the Prosecutor’s claim when 
considered in the limited context of Article 12(2), it may be undermined when 
‘conduct’ is placed in the larger context of the Statute as a whole. There are numerous 
references in the Statute that support the conclusion that ‘conduct’ refers specifically 
to the acts of the alleged perpetrator. The use of the term ‘conduct’ in Article 22 is 
particularly interesting because it not only refers to conduct, but also uses the 
identical term ‘conduct in question’ found in Article 12(2)(a). It states, ‘[a] person 
shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.’91 
This formulation appears to equate the terms ‘conduct’ and ‘crime’, but in such a way 
that it is reasonable to understand ‘crime’ to refer to the criminally culpable acts of 
the alleged perpetrator and not all of the elements that make up a crime.  
 There are other references to ‘conduct’ in the Statute that support the 
conclusion that ‘conduct’ refers to the actions of the alleged perpetrator. Article 17 
declares inadmissible cases in which the accused ‘has already been tried for conduct 
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which is the subject of the complaint.’92 Similarly, Article 20, the provision on ne bis 
in idem, refers to ‘conduct which formed the basis of crimes’ and ‘conduct also 
proscribed under article 6, 7, 8 or 8 bis’.93 These references to ‘conduct’ can also be 
read narrowly to refer only to the criminal conduct of the alleged culprit. Further 
instances in which conduct is equated to the criminal acts of the accused but not 
necessarily the crime itself can also be found in Articles 24, 30, 31, 32, 78, 90, 93 and 
101. An examination of these references leads to the conclusion that conduct may be 
used in more than one way in the Statute but that it can be understood to refer only to 
the acts or omissions of the person thought to have committed criminal acts. As a 
result, the meaning of ‘conduct’ is not entirely clear when place in the larger context 
of the Rome Statute.  
 Next, the Office of the Prosecutor asserted that the Statute’s drafters struggled 
with distinguishing between conduct and consequence and ‘“sometimes views on 
where to draw the line […] differed.”’94 This argument is somewhat specious as it 
relies on the notion that because the drafters of the Rome Statute disagreed about the 
distinction between ‘conduct’ and ‘consequence’ it means that there is no real 
difference between the terms. In fact, the opinions of the drafters differed about a 
great number of topics and very few of the terms in the Statute would have any 
meaning at all if unanimity amongst the drafters is a necessary criterion. The Office of 
the Prosecutor also supported its argument by suggesting that contemporary 
commentators were unable to clearly define the term ‘consequence’ or explain how it 
differed from ‘conduct’ in their review of the discussions of the subject during the 
Rome Conference.95 While this may be, it is clear from the Elements of Crimes that 
the terms ‘conduct’ and ‘consequences’ are not synonymous. The General 
Introduction to the Elements of Crimes indicates that crimes falling under the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court can be made up of as many as four 
different types of elements: conduct, consequence, circumstance and for some crimes, 
                                                        
92 Art. 17(1)(c) ICCSt. 
93 Art. 20 ICCSt. 
94 Ibid; citing M. Kelt and H. Van Hebel, ‘What Are Elements of Crimes?’, in R.S. 
Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court” Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 1999), at 15, 26-7, 39-
40. 
95 Prosecution’s Request, supra note 33, at fn. 109. 
 20 
a mental element.96 These elements are listed in order when describing each crime, 
with the conduct element always coming first.97 Organising the elements in this way 
suggests that everything contained in the first element describes the conduct that must 
occur for the crime to be committed.  
 Further, scholars have also delineated the difference between these two terms. 
Gerhard Werle defines ‘consequence’ so as to include all of the effects of the 
conduct.98 Antonio Cassese describes ‘consequences’ as ‘the effects caused by one’s 
conduct.’99 Kai Ambos asserts that Article 30 of the Rome Statute makes clear that 
‘conduct’ is distinct from ‘consequence’.100 He concludes that this distinction ‘makes 
it difficult’ to allow the exercise of jurisdiction based only on the consequences of a 
crime being felt on the territory of a state party.101  
 The difference between ‘conduct’ and ‘consequence’ is also borne out by the 
specific definition of deportation found in the Elements of Crimes. Deportation or 
forcible transfer occurs when the perpetrator expels or engages in other coercive acts 
that result in a person or people relocating to another state or location.102 Under this 
definition, the conduct attributable to the perpetrator are the acts of expulsion and/or 
other forms of coercion while the consequence of that behaviour is that the victims 
are forced to relocate. There is a clear relationship between the conduct and its 
consequence, but that does not mean that the consequence is part of the conduct. The 
Office of the Prosecutor fails to explore this distinction in its request and the Pre-Trial 
Chamber did not address when, if ever, the consequences of conduct can be 
considered part of the conduct itself.  
 The Prosecutor’s Office has, in other contexts, examined how close the 
relationship between conduct and its consequences must be for those consequences to 
serve as the basis for jurisdiction under Article 12(2)(a). In its Article 5 Report on the 
Situation in the Republic of Korea, the Prosecutor’s Office evaluated whether 
aggressive military acts performed by North Korea and directed towards the territory 
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of South Korea could give rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by the International 
Criminal Court. 103  The jurisdictional situation under consideration in the Korean 
context was similar to the Myanmar and Rohingya matter to the extent that the state in 
which the criminal conduct took place, North Korea, is not a state party to the Rome 
Statute, while the place in which the effects of those actions were felt, South Korea, is 
a state party.104 The Prosecutor’s Office concluded that in that matter the Court did 
have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12(2)(a) because the conduct of firing military 
ordinance could not be separated from the consequence of hitting the area at which it 
was targeted.105 In the view of the Prosecutor, differentiating between the two under 
these circumstances would create an artificial distinction when the conduct and the 
consequences ‘are one and the same’.106 
In a subsequent report, the Prosecutor’s Office further elaborated on its 
understanding of the requisite closeness between conduct and consequences to 
support an exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. It demonstrated that there needed to 
be a very close relationship between the conduct and the consequences to form an 
adequate basis for jurisdiction. In the Article 53(1) report submitted by the Office of 
the Prosecutor in the Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, it indicated that there needed to be a very close connection between 
conduct and consequences for the latter to provide a sound basis for a finding of 
jurisdiction.107 There, the Office of the Prosecutor was considering the extent of its 
jurisdiction to open an investigation into an incident that occurred on a flotilla of 
ships on 31 May 2010.108 The Office of the Prosecutor asserted that the Court only 
had jurisdiction over events that took place on the vessels registered to state parties of 
the Rome Statute.109 The Office of the Prosecutor reached this conclusion on the basis 
that ‘[n]othing in the Statute, commentary, or relevant jurisprudence supports the 
proposition that the Court’s jurisdiction would also extend to any events that, while 
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related to the events on board the vessels in the flotilla, occurred after individuals 
were taken off the vessels.’110  
 These two reports support the proposition that for the International Criminal 
Court to exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of the consequences occurring in the 
territory of a state party, there must be more than a mere relationship between the 
perpetrator’s conduct and its consequences. Instead, there must be a sufficiently close 
relationship between the events so as to suggest that they are essentially indivisible. 
Whether a close enough relationship exists between the actions that took place in 
Myanmar and the Rohingyas’ entry into Bangladesh is open to debate. It could be 
argued, as the Pre-Trial Chamber found, that the crossing of an international border is 
a necessary part of deportation and that the very act of crossing a border under such 
circumstances is inextricably linked to the conduct that precipitated the crossing.  
Alternatively, one might assert that although the actions that took place in Myanmar 
did result in the Rohingya crossing the border with Bangladesh, it was not the 
necessary outcome of those actions. These actions could have equally caused an 
internal displacement, as it had in the past, further persecution of the Rohingya within 
the borders of Myanmar, the displacement of the Rohingya to India, also not a party 
to the Rome Statute, or some other unforeseen outcome. That more than one possible 
outcome existed may indicate that the consequence, which is the only part of the 
alleged crime to occur in the territory of a state party, may not have been sufficiently 
connected to the conduct to support a finding that the International Criminal Court has 
jurisdiction in this matter. 
 Finally, the Prosecutor’s Office asserted that the object and purpose of the 
Statute requires that only one element of a crime need occur in the territory of a state 
party for the International Criminal Court to have jurisdiction. It argues that such a 
finding would be in line with national and international law and to read the Statute 
otherwise would undermine the Court’s complementarity regime.111 In support of that 
position, the request by the Office of the Prosecutor identifies a variety of states that 
allow jurisdiction to be exercised so long as one element of a crime takes place on its 
territory.112 The Pre-Trial Chamber picked up on this argument and implicitly agreed 
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with the approach advanced by the Prosecutor’s Office.113 In particular, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber found that the drafters of the Statute intended to allow the International 
Criminal Court to exercise jurisdiction to the same extent as its states parties.114  
 The wording of the Rome Statute calls this conclusion into question. All of the 
national laws discussed by the Office of the Prosecutor specifically allow jurisdiction 
to be exercised in situations that are broader than what is described in Article 
12(2)(a). Argentina, China, Germany, Iran and Italy all explicitly state that they will 
have jurisdiction over a crime if either the act or omission constituting the crime, or 
its consequence or effect, occurs on its territory.115 This is in direct contrast to the 
Rome Statute, which only allows jurisdiction if ‘the conduct in question’ took place in 
the territory of a state party. The International Criminal Court’s approach is clearly 
more limited as it only mentions conduct and not consequences. Further, that those 
national laws see the need to refer to consequences in this regard has the tendency to 
show they are not thought to be synonymous with conduct.  
 Several other countries take a somewhat different approach that is still more 
expansive than what is contained in the Rome Statute. Canada and England and 
Wales each allow the exercise of jurisdiction when ‘a significant portion’ or a 
‘substantial measure’ of the crime takes place in their territory.116 France, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, South Africa and the United States all have jurisdiction when 
some, but not all of the elements occur in their territory.117 These states are also taking 
a different approach from that set out in the Rome Statute by expressly stating that 
jurisdiction exists so long as some part of the crime takes place in the relevant 
territory. While it is apparent that a number of states allow jurisdiction to be exercised 
so long as some part of the crime takes place within its territory that does not mean 
the same holds true for the International Criminal Court. The statutory language used 
in these national statutes is fundamentally different from the wording contained in the 
Rome Statute. As a result, it does not follow that the approach taken in national 
jurisdictions should necessarily also apply to the International Criminal Court. 
 The Office of the Prosecutor also argues that international law supports a 
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finding that jurisdiction exists because one element of the crime occurred in the 
territory of a state party.118 The territoriality principle stands for the proposition that a 
State has jurisdiction over any crimes that occur or have been committed on its 
territory, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator.119 When a crime occurs in 
more than one state the objective territoriality of the crime is considered. Objective 
territoriality permits a state to make a jurisdictional claim over a crime that is 
completed in its territory, or when ‘one of the constituent elements of the offence, and 
more especially its effects, have taken place there’. 120  Objective territoriality is 
particularly relevant in the context of crimes of effect, where the conduct takes place 
entirely in the territory of one state but where the effect of the crime takes place in a 
different state.121 
 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision that the International Criminal Court has 
jurisdiction over the deportation of the Rohingya is in line with some earlier 
commentators who have suggested that the Statute allows for the exercise of objective 
territoriality by the Court.122 However, that position does not take proper account of 
the fact that the territoriality principle is an approach designed to establish when 
states, not international criminal justice institutions, have jurisdiction over a crime. 
There is no reason to believe, despite the insistence of the Office of the Prosecutor to 
the contrary, that objective territoriality should also act to confer jurisdiction to the 
International Criminal Court. Jurisdiction based on the territoriality principle is a 
reflection of state sovereignty; it permits the state to regulate and enforce activities 
within its own borders without fear of interference by external forces.123 It is a state’s 
exercise of the freedom to establish its own laws and regulations within its own 
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territory and a demonstration that it has the equal right to do so.124 The International 
Criminal Court is the product of a political agreement amongst the state parties.125 As 
such, it lacks sovereignty and, in turn, the territorial jurisdiction that goes with it.126 
While the Court may have the authority to decide the extent of its own jurisdiction, 
that determination is limited by territoriality as set out in the Statute.127 States are 
generally protective of their sovereignty and wish to reserve for themselves the 
ultimate authority to control activities occurring within their own territory.128 In fact, 
evidence exists to suggest that state parties intended to limit the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court.129  
 Further, the language of Article 12(2)(a) itself provides a basis for finding that 
the drafters meant for it to be narrowly interpreted. Article 12(2)(a) explicitly requires 
that the conduct, not the consequences or effects of that conduct, take place on the 
territory of a state party. The Statute’s silence with regard to extending the 
jurisdiction of the Court to those states upon whose territory the effects of crime 
occurs may be intentional and the omission of the concept from the Statute supports a 
narrow construction of Article 12. 130  The drafters of the International Criminal 
Court’s Statute would have been aware that some countries take an approach to 
jurisdiction where by it can be asserted if the effects of a crime take place in its 
territory. They would also have been familiar with the objective territoriality approach 
that follows a similar formula. They could have adopted a statute that addressed 
jurisdiction in the same way if they had so wished. The fact that they did not is 
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significant and should not be disregarded.  
 It must also be noted that the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression discussed inserting language in the Statute that would have defined 
‘conduct’ as it is used in Article 12(2)(a) to encompass both conduct and its 
consequence.131 However, despite apparent ‘general support’ for the proposition, the 
proposed change was not implemented.132 The draft amendments to the Rome Statute 
relating to the crime of aggression do not mention any modification to the Article 
12(2)(a) definition of ‘conduct’, nor was any such amendment ever adopted.133  It is 
not known why this amendment to the Statute did not come to fruition but three 
relevant points can be extrapolated from the fact it was discussed. First, the members 
of the working group were aware of the jurisdictional theory of objective territoriality; 
second, they were also aware that the Statute, as written, did not comport with 
objective territoriality; and third, despite their awareness of both they chose to do 
nothing. 
When the rules of interpretation established in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties are applied to Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, it supports the 
conclusion that the term ‘conduct’ relates to the actions of the alleged perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity, not their victims. In this case, all of the actions performed 
by the perpetrators credited with forcing the Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh were 
carried out in Myanmar. The only activity that took place in the territory of a state 
party was the entry of the victims into Bangladesh as a result of the actions taken in 
Myanmar. It is apparent that this, on its own, is not enough to support the existence of 
jurisdiction. As a result, it is unlikely that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to find 
that the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction in this situation complies with 
the terms of Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.       
4. Effects of this Ruling 
 It has been suggested that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s ruling ‘will have far 
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reaching consequences’ on the prosecution of current and future occurrences of 
human rights violations.134 The ruling is seen as creating a ‘route to accountability’ 
for at least some perpetrators of human rights abuses that until now have been 
otherwise immune from prosecution.135 In fact, the effects of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
ruling are already being felt. In March 2019, the Guernica Centre for International 
Justice submitted a communication to the Prosecutor’s Office requesting that it begin 
a preliminary investigation into the deportation by the Syrian government of some 
Syrian nationals into Jordan.136 The Guernica Centre argues that sufficient parallels 
exist between the situations in Myanmar and Syria to warrant the opening of a 
preliminary investigation into crimes committed in the latter state on the basis of the 
Court’s decision with regard to the former.137 This is largely a continuation of an 
argument first advanced in the Amicus Curiae Brief submitted by the Guernica Centre 
in support of the Prosecutor’s Request for a ruling about jurisdiction over the 
Rohingya situation. In its brief, the Guernica Centre submits that it is ‘universally 
accepted’ that millions of Syrian citizens have been displaced as a result of the 
conflict in Syria, ‘a significant portion’ of whom left Syria entirely.138 The majority of 
these people are thought to have been the subject of ‘targeted attacks’ by the Syrian 
government and its allies, with the use of barrel bombs and chemical weapons, as well 
as the intentional destruction of hospitals and other forms of infrastructure, being 
amongst the tactics used to drive the affected people out of Syria. 139  For these 
reasons, the two situations are seen as being alike.140 
The Guernica Centre is not alone in their efforts to encourage the Prosecutor 
to open a Preliminary Investigation in Syria. A collection of British lawyers working 
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on behalf of a group of Syrian refugees living in Jordan have also submitted a 
communication to the Prosecutor requesting that an investigation be opened against 
senior Syrian officials including president Bashir al Assad.141 The decisions to submit 
the communication is based on the belief that ‘a jurisdictional gateway…has opened 
up finally for the ICC prosecutor to investigate the perpetrators who are most 
responsible.’142  
 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision about the Rohingya is being viewed as an 
opportunity to increase accountability for human rights abuses that would otherwise 
go unpunished. While it is appropriate to explore all paths available to increase 
human rights protections, it is necessary that these new approaches be founded on a 
firm legal footing. Unfortunately, that may not be the case with the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s decision that the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over some 
human rights violations allegedly committed by the government of Myanmar against 
the Rohingya. Therefore, a modicum of caution is advised before victims of similar 
situations wholeheartedly embrace the possibility that decision means that they too 
will have an opportunity to experience justice being done.  
5. Conclusion  
There are significant reasons to question whether the Pre-Trial Chamber 
properly decided the Prosecutor’s Request Under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations 
of the Court. From a procedural standpoint, it is highly doubtful that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber possesses the competence to make a decision about jurisdiction at this stage 
of proceedings. The statutory provision serving as the basis for the Prosecution’s 
original request is only applicable during the case stage of proceedings. As a result, 
that provision cannot be used to permit the Pre-Trial Chamber to decide this matter at 
this point in proceedings. The Pre-Trial Chamber avoided this problem by identifying 
two other parts of the Statute that it believed gave it the authority to issue its decision. 
However, reliance on Article 119(1) is misplaced as its application would deprive 
Article 19(1) of any meaning. Article 21(1)(b) is also not applicable in this situation 
as it can only be used when there is a lacuna in the Statute. This means that the Pre-
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Trial Chamber did not have a procedural foundation on which to make its decision.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusion that some part of the conduct making up 
the crime against humanity of deportation occurred in the territory of a state party is 
also dubious. The term ‘conduct’ as used in the Rome Statute and the Elements of 
Crimes can be read in such a way to mean that the actions of the people alleged to 
have committed crimes must occur in the territory of a state party. The conduct the 
Pre-Trial Chamber relied on to form its conclusion that the International Criminal 
Court has jurisdiction in this matter cannot be attributed to the perpetrators. While it 
may represent an element of the crime, it is not conduct in the sense meant by the 
Statute. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber appears to have conflated the term ‘conduct’ 
with ‘crime’ leading it to the conclude that the Court has jurisdiction over the crime of 
deportation as it relates to the Rohingya as a result of the victims crossing the border 
into Bangladesh. This approach may not accord with the plain language of Article 
12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute. 
 Ultimately, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision appears to rest on an imperfect 
legal foundation. Legitimate concerns exist about the substance of the decision and 
whether the Pre-Trial Chamber was empowered at this point in the proceedings to 
make the decision at all. While the Pre-Trial Chamber should be applauded for 
suggesting a creative approach for delivering at least some partial form of 
accountability for the crimes committed against the Rohingya, it needs to be wary of 
offering false hope to victims. Legal decisions built on faulty premises are prone to 
reversal, which in turn can dash the heightened expectations of the victims of atrocity 
crimes. It is necessary for the International Criminal Court to ensure it is always 
proceeding on firm legal ground to make it less vulnerable to criticism and to better 
deliver the justice the victims of international crimes so desperately crave.  
 
